This paper demonstrates that radical regulatory changes can be tantamount to 
Introduction
Resource based views of the firm place special emphasis on the roles of heterogeneous capabilities of firms in driving variety in strategy. They are particularly pertinent for dynamic markets, where firm-specific deployment of capabilities, entrepreneurship and ad hoc problem solving skills determine the winners of the race for market shares, as new or untapped economic opportunities emerge. In the absence of natural, socio-economic or political upheavals, radical innovations and technological discontinuities are often considered necessary to provoke such market change and opportunities. In contrast, through an examination of the Indian pharmaceutical sector, the present paper demonstrates that radical regulatory changes can impact capability development similarly. It shows that radical regulatory changes such as the Indian Patent
Act of 1970, the New Industrial Policy of 1991 and the signing of TRIPS (Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights System) in 1995 served to open up new global economic opportunities and constraints in the wake of which the winners and losers were selected as a function of the dynamic firm capabilities developed that were most appropriate for the new market environment.
The effect of new opportunities on firm strategy is a major concern of the literature on dynamic capabilities and market evolution and it is to this stream that our paper makes three types of contributions. First, it highlights how regulatory changes can serve to reorient technological capabilities even in the absence of a radial technological discontinuity.
Liberalisation of industrial policy and homogenization of intellectual property rights initiated "pull and push" forces on the R&D and innovation focus of Indian firms. The "push" factor was the ban on re-engineering of patented goods and the "pull" factor was the emergence of a consciousness of "opportunities presented by lucrative international markets" for the exploitation of already-acquired technological skills and the development of new ones. Starting from a unique R&D focus for developing more cost-efficient or quality enhancing processes, market leaders now have a multi-focus incorporating a transition towards the development of technological capabilities required for new drug discovery. However, this re-orientation has had little impact on the industrial organization of the local market.
Second, the paper identifies the kinds of dynamic capabilities that can be developed as a response to radical regulatory changes through a study of four leading Indian pharmaceutical firms. They are of three kinds and significantly inter-related: diversification of knowledge and technological capabilities; internationalisation of production and distribution units; integration in the innovation creation process of Western country firms through providing services related to innovation creation.
Third, it affirms that radical regulatory change can provide a period of strategic transition when the portfolio of dynamic capabilities developed by firms varies significantly. Such transition strategies are a function of past firm specific technological trajectories, firm-specific managerial vision and inter-organisational learning through observation of strategies of other firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature on resource based views of strategy formation and section 3 provides a background to the Indian pharmaceutical industry and examines the evolution of the R&D strategies of Indian firms before and after TRIPS to draw inferences and a hypothesis to be studied by the case studies. Section 4 details the evolution of strategy and capability with the help of case studies of four established firms. Section 5 discusses the findings of the case studies. Section 6 concludes.
Capabilities in changing markets
The literature on firm capabilities originated in the writings of Penrose (1959) who posited that the growth of firms was conditioned by their particular inherent resources and a desire to exploit these more fully. A rich tradition of literature on strategic management built on this perspective to predict what strategies firms would employ for growth (e.g. diversification as in Rumelt 1984 ) and the problems involved in growth strategies that stretched the core competencies of firms. The mechanisms by which new capabilities come into being have been founded on behavioural and evolutionary hypotheses. Nelson and Winter (1982) argued that each firms' access to technological and organisational knowledge is different and conditioned upon its past learning. This kind of learning and the consequent stretching of profit possibilities in production is 'localised' within firms and so is difficult to imitate by other firms. Thus, this perspective emphasises the heterogeneity of firm capability as well as its stickiness implying that firms pursue different strategies that are optimal given their firm-specific capabilities.
Firm capabilities also evolve over time due to endogenous market changes and exogenous shocks and this change is referred to as a dynamic capability. Such evolution disrupts or adds new value to the rents to existing capabilities thereby influencing the competitive positions of firms. As Teece et al. (1997, p. 529 ) point out, "competitive advantage is not just a function of how one plays the game; it is also a function of the assets that one has to play with and how these assets can be deployed and re-deployed in a changing market". Furthermore, Teece (1998, p. 72) defines dynamic capabilities as "the ability to sense and then seize new opportunities, and to reconfigure and protect knowledge assets, competencies, and complementary assets and technologies to achieve sustainable competitive advantage" and argues that dynamic capabilities are the key to strategic changes. In fact, the dynamic capabilities framework outlined by Teece et al. (1997) proposes a triad of factors that influence the development of firms' competitive advantage: firms' internal processes (organisational and managerial); firms ' (asset) positioning in the market; and the paths open to it consequent on the first two factors.
Often the paths open to firms may be quite narrow making value-augmenting strategic change slow and incremental.
An important factor in rapidly changing markets is the possibility of leverage through deployment and re-deployment of existing capabilities. Which product market niche or business model best utilises/ gives value to the internal and external assets of the firm? Teece (1998: 72-75) notes the importance of sensing and seizing such advantage in realising the best value for a firm's resources through entrepreneurial processes as well as entrepreneurial strategy within incumbent firms.
It needs the ability to seize new opportunities, absorb and manage risks in much the same way as entrepreneurial firms that enter into markets for the first time.
Teece's framework has prompted much discussion and analysis of what constitute dynamic capabilities in the context of market changes. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) note that dynamic capabilities are a set of identifiable processes such as product development, strategic decision making and alliancing which are idiosyncratic in their detail and path dependent in their emergence but nevertheless with some common features across firms.
They also argue that in rapidly changing markets such dynamic capabilities may be quite simple experimental and fragile processes with great uncertainty surrounding final outcomes. In a further contribution to this debate, Winter (2003) has argued that 'the strategic substance of capabilities involves the patterning of activity, and that costly investments are typically required in sustaining such patterning'. Dynamic capabilities thus refer to a higher order capability, viz. routines to improve on the established routines of firms. Put differently, it is the higher order capabilities that have the capacity to produce lasting new competitive advantage as a consequence of the change in market opportunities.
However, firms can and do accomplish changes in strategy without the reliance on higher order capability by ad hoc problem solving.
In contrast to the role of new opportunities in redefining capabilities and developing new ones, a large literature on technology management has subscribed to a product cycle view of the industry and seen different types of capabilities as necessary to succeed in different stages of the industry life cycle. Thus, it is well recognised in this literature that different problem solving approaches generate strategic variety in the early stages of a technology/industry evolution (Utterback, 1996) . However, once a dominant design is established there is lock-in and a greater convergence of firm strategies. Thus, strategic variety will always accompany the emergence of a new economic/technological opportunity and the variety of strategies generated will define the direction of evolution of the industry concerned, since one of the experimental designs will one day become the dominant design.
3. Salient Features of the Indian Pharmaceutical sector 3.1: Regulatory reform and industrial structure
It is often touted that the Indian Patent Act of 1970 infused life into the Indian pharmaceutical industry. By this time, the Indian government had invested in the creation of a network of universities and research institutions, which were generating large pools of qualified labour in the form of chemists, pharmacists, engineers and managers available to work in pharmaceutical firms. On the demand side, millions were without access to basic drugs and national and international procurement agencies ensured certain demand. Thus, the change in regulation opened the market gates to entrants, which could develop the necessary dynamic capabilities to bring generics to the market through new, cost-efficient, process technologies and grab market shares through penetration pricing in quintessential Bertrand competition games. Production, exports and imports shot up after the adoption of economic reforms (see figure 1 ). The industry grew rapidly in the 1990s, with an average industry growth rate of about 15% for bulk drugs and 20% for formulations (OPPI, 2001) . Currently, the Indian pharmaceuticals market ranks 4th in volume and 13th in value in the world ii. The value of its production is estimated to be approximately $4.5 billion iii and it employs about 5 million workers directly and 24 million workers indirectly. The industry structure remains dualistic with about 90% of the 20,000 firms in the small scale sector.
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The decade preceding TRIPS was also marked by technological upheavals and radical regulatory reform in Western markets. Policy makers in Western countries also became more sensitive to the need for developing the market for generics drugs, in order to bring down the costs of providing health care and decrease social security payments to its citizens. Ironically, these concerns were quite similar to those which had provoked the Indian Patent Act of 1970.
The USA pioneered new policies designed to decrease spending on medical care
and the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed in 1984 to stimulate the market for generics, lower prices and enable greater accessibility to healthcare for its citizens. Prior to this law, a generics producer could not apply for marketing approval until after patent expiration and had to submit the full experimental and clinical data as is required for a new drug to prove safety and efficacy. This delayed market entry by as much as 3 years after patent expiry.
With the Hatch-Waxman Act, manufacturers of generic drugs no longer had to go through a lengthy period of extensive clinical trials -demonstration of bio-equivalence was sufficient to acquire marketing approval for a generic drug. European countries followed suit but the situation remains confusing as its national laws remain different.
Just as Indian patent law of 1970 had made the pharmaceutical market more competitive, the legislation to make entry into the generics market easier was also accompanied by new entrants who made the market more price-competitive. The firms leading the generics challenge internationally were Teva and Mylan from Israel and Ranbaxy and DRL from India.
Evolution of R&D strategies among Indian firms
The market opportunities opened by the Indian Patent Act of 1970, the constraints for expanding the manufacturing base under the license Raj and the endogenous evolution of the market together determined the capabilities of Indian firms in this period. Market leadership belonged to firms who had competence in chemical process technologies necessary for re-engineering targeted drugs and the ability to withstand technology races in process improvements through pursuing a diversified product portfolio. The common features of technological capabilities and strategy among all the leading firms included low R&D intensity, innovation focus on cost-efficient or quality enhancing processes, direct commercialization of innovation in countries where the product patent regime was not recognized and technology transactions with Western multinationals in the form of licensing and marketing agreements (which worked both ways).
The knowledge base of Indian pharmaceutical firms was firmly embedded in organic and synthetic chemistry and any R&D investment was specifically targeted to lower the costs of production of selected drugs identified as having good commercial prospects, with the outlays just to the point needed to arrive at the objective (Ramani, 2002 TRIPS introduced three main elements of change in the Indian patent system. It banned production and sales of re-engineered pharmaceutical products. It extended product patent protection applied to all branches of manufacturing, including drugs, the period of protection to 20 years. Finally, it forbids discrimination between imported and domestic products.
A study based on interviews just prior to TRIPS enforcement revealed that pharmaceutical firms were adopting one or more of three types of strategic positioning in response to TRIPS (Ramani and Maria, 2005) . First, the target for R&D is the creation of drugs, vaccines and diagnostics that are off-patent or are soon to be off patent, especially in Pradhan (2007) confirms that small firms spend either 0% or less than 1% of sales revenue on R&D.
The above discussion leads us to the following two hypotheses on strategy and the evolution of dynamic capabilities of Indian pharmaceutical firms after liberalisation that we examine in the next section through case studies.
Hypothesis 1: The combined effect of the Hatch-Waxmann Act, economic liberalisation and TRIPS has been to provide new incentives to exploit existing opportunities, which were hitherto not given much attention, such as the international generics market, technology collaborations with Western firms and transition towards new drug discovery.
Hypothesis 2: The growth of the Indian innovator firms depends on their capacity to identify and develop the optimal dynamic capabilities to exploit opportunities associated with the different stages of the sequential process of bringing a new drug to the market. Our reasons for focussing on these four firms alone are two-fold. First, there is a very strong correlation between size and R&D intensity in the Indian pharmaceutical sector (Pradhan, 2007; Ramani and Putz, 2001) . Therefore, major innovations in terms of process and product are likely to emerge only from the top 30 firms. As of now, no 'NCE' or 'New Chemical Entity' has been commercialized by an Indian firm, though some are in the clinical trials phase. Clearly, if any Indian firm at all is going to commercialize an NCE, and that too an NCE that can lead to the creation of a major drug, it is likely be one of the top 10 firms. Three of the four case study firms are also among the top 10 firms in the Indian pharmaceutical sector. Second, all the four firms we study were established in the pre- R&D activity in Ranbaxy started in the late 1970s when a small R&D division that employed eight people was established. Early R&D efforts were focussed on formulating bulk drugs into dosage forms and on developing cheap processes to synthesise bulk drugs.
Strategy and the evolution of dynamic capability: Four Case Studies
Soon after Ranbaxy began to concentrate its R&D efforts towards developing a novel production process that would let it sidestep other company's process patents, with a view to entering the profitable generics market. In 1985 these efforts bore fruit and Ranbaxy to a product that was difficult to manufacture and in addition would be too expensive for the Indian market. After three years and spending nearly $2 million, Ranbaxy emerged with a non-infringing process for the manufacturer of Cefaclor and also managed to obtain higher yields from its process as compared to Eli Lily's original production process.
From 1995, Ranbaxy stepped up its R&D expenditures from 2% of sales to 5%
and established state-of-the-art multi-disciplinary R&D facilities at Gurgaon (near New Delhi). The company's new strategic intent was to ascend the research value chain and accordingly it began to establish capabilities in the areas of discovery research, delivery systems and clinical research. The strategy for doing so was to adopt a two stage approach,
where the firm expected to use the development of capabilities in drug delivery systems as a stepping stone to the development of drug discovery capabilities.
In 1999 Ranbaxy registered its first major success, when it developed the once-a-day dosage for the Ciprofloxacin molecule. This improvement in dose administration promised greater patient-compliance compared to multiple dosages offered by the patent holder, Bayer, and hence, was a major step forward. Ranbaxy licensed the once-a-day technology to Bayer of Germany for US$10 million, for further development. In 2004, Bayer successfully launched the 500mg and 1gm once-a-day formulation in US, based on delivery technology platforms developed by Ranbaxy ix .
Ranbaxy had no prior experience drug discovery research, and therefore it first concentrated on building a strong, well focused inter disciplinary research team. Ranbaxy presents the quintessential example of staged growth through integration of pharmaceutical production, R&D activities and internationalisation efforts. It showed great alertness and foresight in grasping the significance of the generics market opportunity long before liberalisation and TRIPs made entry into Western markets for generics easier.
In expanding its R&D capability the firm has paid attention to human resource recruitment as a means to building up skills, internationalising its R&D effort in order to stay close to regulatory market needs and lastly managed risk in undertaking new R&D through targeted small outcomes in the drug delivery space that can help the company to build its technological profile further. However, recognising its limitations in the ability to test and market new drugs, Ranbaxy has also preferred to rely on licensing to multinationals for the direct marketing of its new dosages and molecules. DRL has entered into out of court settlements where a Para IV strategy appears likely to succeed. Thus, DRL has made a private settlement with Novartis to delay its launch of the generic rival to Exelon-its drug for Alzheimer's. In 2007, the new drug discovery units of DRL were de-merged from the rest of the business-a trend that was followed by Ranbaxy and several other leading firms.
Wockhardt Ltd
Wockhardt was started by Khorakiwala family in 1959 as a small pharmaceutical distribution and selling entity. Interviews with company officials indicate that the company had placed biotechnology at the heart of its strategy, and made it core to the development path of the company since the early 1990s (see fig. 4 ). Thus, from the early 1990s the company has spent 20 -30% of its total research budget on biotech R&D. Wockhardt's R&D centre at Aurangabad initiated programs in the field of new drug discovery research in 1997, a clear break from the past when the focus had been uniquely on biogenerics.
Wockhardt has decided to concentrate its efforts on the anti-infective therapeutic segment, as the main thrust area in new drug discovery R&D. Moreover, it has chosen to explore the biotechnology route to drug discovery and in order to gain experience in biotechnology it has concentrated on the bio-generics segment in its generic market strategy. As of now, the drug discovery programme has yielded a few lead molecules, one of which, WCK- 
Nicholas Piramal India Ltd (NPIL)
NPIL is a part of the Piramal Enterprises, one of India's largest diversified business groups with interests in retailing, textiles, auto components and engineering. In 2000, the group consisted of 26 companies (including joint ventures), with aggregate revenues of about US$500 million. In the last ten years their pharmaceutical business has emerged as the fastest growing and most profitable of the lot (see Figure 5 ). 
Discussion of the results of case studies
The findings of the case studies clearly support hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 of section 4. In addition, they refine hypothesis 2 by identifying the strategy-mix and capabilities required to exploit the opportunities thrown up by the regulatory changes viz.
(i) entry into the generic markets of developed countries, (ii) collaboration with Western multinationals on different segments of the sequential process of new drug commercialization; and (iii) acquisition of skills for new drug discovery and commercialization. The case study evidence is summarised in Tables 4a-4c.
5.1: Tapping the international generics market
Entry into the global generics market could be achieved through exporting activity and /or through the setting up of production and manufacturing facilities for generics in particular countries. Exports of generics could be targeted to the higher value but tightly regulated Western markets or to other developing country (DC) markets. Similarly, setting up of manufacturing facilities in third countries could also take one of three forms:
Greenfield investments, acquisitions or joint ventures. Table 4a gives some indicators to measure the extent to which each mode was employed by the four companies we studied suggesting learning through observation of compatriot competitors and revealing subtle differences in firm strategy.
Early bird gets the worm of international generics? Ranbaxy was the first company to spot the opportunity offered by the US generics market and started preparations to enter it long before liberalisation and TRIPS. Indeed their first success was announced through the development of a non-infringing patent in 1991. DRL was possibly spurred by Ranbaxy success -prior to 1994 they were content to sell API to worldwide markets. Ranbaxy was the first to use the ANDA filing route to enter the US generics market directly. It used the steady but low return Para 1 to Para III approach of ANDA fillings, where the generic manufacturer enters the market only after expiry of the product patent and securing a niche in the US antibiotics segment. On the other hand, DRL adopted the aggressive strategy of Para IV filings, which involves invalidating existing patents or producing non-infringing process through a costly process of litigation. It is a high risk-high return strategy due to the litigation costs involved and the 180-day market exclusivity that the firm wins on a successful challenge. Though DRL got six-month exclusivity for selling Fluoxentine 40mg capsules in US, it also received a severe set back when it lost the AmVaz case to Pfizer.
Thus, the two early entrants differed quite markedly in their propensity to take risks. The two later entrants have followed the example set by Ranbaxy and DRL but the low-risk strategy of Para 1-3 applications is more popular among them.
Internationalisation through subsidiaries and joint ventures: Ranbaxy internationalised by establishing green-field subsidiaries in Nigeria and Malaysia while DRL internationalised first through exports of ingredients to Europe and then by internationalising of their R&D before internationalising their production. Both firms targeted the US market for generics, set up their own distribution and marketing networks in the US and tried to achieve brand recognition for their generic products, before expanding into the European generics markets. In contrast, Wockhardt started from developing country markets in Asia and Latin America like Ranbaxy but thereafter preferred to target the European markets earlier.
NPIL has established subsidiaries in advanced markets such as Europe and US primarily to target contract research and manufacturing opportunities.
Internationalisation through acquisitions:
Starting with the acquisition of Ohm laboratories in the USA in 1995 by Ranbaxy, other firms have followed with a string of acquisitions of generic plants that are already FDA approved in US and Europe. This strategy of internationalisation by acquisition permits the entry into developed country market and incorporates more cost efficient processes. Though Ranbaxy and DRL pioneered this approach, it has been imitated by all the four case study firms and increasingly adopted by other leading Indian firms as well.
Geographic coverage: Table 4a 
5.2: Integrating in the global division of innovative labour
Cross-licensing of process improvements to foreign pharmaceutical firms and manufacturing the improved product was part of the strategy of the more technologically competent firms even before liberalisation and TRIPS. In addition, the case studies reveal new forms of collaboration such as licensing out of molecules discovered by Indian firms, joint R&D contracts and outsourced clinical trials. All of our four case study firms have participated in the international division of labour and Table 4b presents evidence on the nature and form by which these firms have positioned themselves. The interesting aspect of Table 4b is that all four firms are quite different in their strategies for participation in the international division of labour.
Licensing out and contract R&D in upstream stages of drug discovery: The type of activity chosen is clearly dependent on the level of technological competence of the company.
Consistent with their higher technological competence as revealed by the rows on ANDAs field and DMF s filed in Table 4a , both Ranabaxy and DRL have tried to use joint R&D agreements and licensing-out to access the complementary capabilities in the drug cycle that they need (viz. screening of appropriate molecules and testing in order to bring to market). However, DRL has set up a separate unit in order to undertake R&D services presumably giving the signal that doing R&D for other firms will not leak their secrets to the generics arm of their business. Neither of the two firms is involved in licensing-out.
Acquiring skills for new drug discovery
The value chain in pharmaceuticals, from least knowledge/value added intensive to most knowledge intensive/value added product is as follows: No Indian pharmaceutical firm has come up with a major innovation in (v) -(viii).
At the moment Ranbaxy, the forerunner is also at the head of the pack with its innovation on dosage formulation. Among our case study firms both Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy's have greater strengths in generics rather than bio-generics, which is the forte of Wockhardt. All four firms we have studied are strong in (i). These gaps in performance are closely linked to missing capabilities along the the different phases of the sequential process of new product development for each of the above categories. capabilities. Proof of this is to be found in the recent attempts of DRL to set up a contract research facility which it has also de-merged from its main generics business-thus resembling more a disintegrated specialist supplier.
5.4: Capabilities, Strategy and Dynamic Capabilities
The preceding section makes it amply clear that there are clear relationships between existing capabilities, changed capabilities in response to new opportunities and target capabilities identified as being likely to capture competitive advantages. While existing technological competence played an important role as did the firm's historical trajectory, two other factors namely, 'firm specific managerial vision', and 'interorganisational learning through observation of compatriot leader firms' also had important roles to play in defining the strategy-mixes adopted by Indian innovators.
The vision of Parminder Singh that Ranbaxy could be a big player in the generics market that was opening up in the US was both audacious and unforeseen. Anji Reddy's ambition to show Indian firms could overturn patents and win guided DRL's forays was viewed in the same light. However, later entrants learnt from both these experiments.
DRL's high risk Para IV strategy has not been imitated, but its successful experiments with acquisitions and inorganic growth to rapidly expand generics capacity has been.
In transitioning to new drug discovery we find that three of the four firms chose different transitioning paths to new drug capabilities -Ranbaxy through improving dosage forms, DRL through speciality chemicals and Wockhardt through pursuing the biogenerics route, yet the strategies that they have used to achieve these transitions have borrowed from each other. Outlicensing, first initiated by DRL was imitated by Ranbaxy and Wockhardt. De-risking drug discovery through de-merger and venture finaice of those R&D subsidiaries was initiated by DRL but is now proving to be popular among other large drug manufacturers. It seems that inter-organisational learning through observation of other firms' successful strategies has significantly influenced the strategies pursued by the firms and may be as important as own firm learning. In this sense the variations in strategy initiated by particular firms have constitute a natural experiment for the whole industry.
Another finding is that while existing capabilities do constrain the strategies firms adopt in the face of new opportunities, 'new' capabilities developed by firms co-evolve with the particular strategy chosen. This is most clearly illustrated by comparing the different experiences of NPIL and Ranbaxy. Starting with strengths in process engineering, Ranbaxy chose to go down the route of becoming an integrated producer of new drugs.
This meant that it would have to acquire 'new' capabilities along the whole of the drug cycle and as we have shown many of its strategic efforts are also geared towards such an outcome. However, NPIL has decided instead that in the new situation, it will play on its strengths and become a specialist supplier favoured by Western drug producers. In choosing to operate as a disintegrated specialist supplier, NPIL will not need to develop the integrative capabilities that Ranbaxy is developing. Instead its strengths may lie in becoming a reliable and trustworthy partner in an innovative division of labour.
Conclusion
The central objective of this paper was to examine, if regulatory changes could be a catalyst for the creation of dynamic capabilities in firms even in the absence of the introducation of radical innovations, through the case study of the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Our analysis clearly confirmed this hypothesis. It also demonstrated that dynamic capabilities can co-evolve with firm strategy in order to exploit new opportunities thrown up by regulatory changes through three main results. typified by NPIL as a specialist supplier; and the "risky capacity building" through challenging Western incumbent firms on their own turf as exemplified by Dr.Reddy's. It is likely that the winning configuration of dynamic capabilities would involve a combination of these three models. The larger the scope targetted, the greater the integrative capabilities across the value chain needed; the narrower the scope chosen, the higher the capability in scale up process engineering and production required. Thus, dynamic capabilities co-evolve with firm strategy and observations of strategies of other firms.
Third, the co-evolution of firm strategy and capability are determined by three main factors: the historical trajectory of the firm and existing capabilities, firm-specific managerial vision and learning by observing the successes and failures of other compatriot firms.
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Where does this leave us on our discussion of dynamic capabilities as 'second order' capabilities-or those capabilities that have the potential to provide lasting competitive advantage in the future in the context of Indian pharmaceuticals? At present, it is not possible to identify the winning strategy or winning dynamic capability as the "transition phase" in response to the sweeping regulatory changes is not yet over and there is no sign of an evolutionary trajectory emerging through selection. In particular it is not yet clear if the integrated model of drug production will lose out to a more disintegrated model of drug discovery. This indicates that firms are still uncertain about the payoffs of the game being played and must discover these through a tatonnement proces involving experimentation, which in turn is a necessary condition for the development of dynamic capabilities.
